The Pentagon Papers , officially titled Vietnam Defense Task Force Office Report , is the United History Department of Defense of America on the US military and political engagement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. The letters were published by Daniel Ellsberg, who had worked on the research; they were first brought to the public attention on the front page of The New York Times in 1971. A 1996 article in The New York Times said that Pentagon Papers i> has demonstrated, inter alia, that the Johnson Administration "systematically lies, not only to the public but also to Congress".
More specifically, the papers reveal that the United States has quietly enlarged its scope of action in the Vietnam War with bombing near Cambodia and Laos, coastal attacks in North Vietnam, and Marine Corps attacks, none reported in the mainstream media..
For his disclosure of Pentagon Papers, Ellsberg was initially accused of conspiracy, espionage and theft of government property, but the allegations were later dropped after prosecutors investigating the Watergate scandal found that staff members at Nixon's White House had ordered so-called " White House Plumbers to engage in unlawful attempts to discredit Ellsberg.
As of June 2011, the whole Pentagon Papers have been declassified and released publicly.
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Contents
Defense Minister Robert McNamara created the Vietnam Study Task Force on June 17, 1967, for the purpose of writing "the encyclopaedic history of the Vietnam War". McNamara claims that he wants to leave a written record for historians, to prevent any policy mistakes in future administration. McNamara neglected to inform President Lyndon Johnson or Secretary of State Dean Rusk of the study. One report claimed that McNamara planned to give the job to his friend Robert F. Kennedy, who sought the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968. McNamara later denied it, though he admitted that he should have told Johnson and Rusk.
Instead of using an existing Ministry of Defense historian, McNamara commissioned his close assistant and Assistant Secretary of Defense John T. McNaughton to collect the papers. McNaughton died in a plane crash one month after work began in June 1967, but the project continues under the direction of Defense Department official Leslie H. Gelb. Thirty-six analysts - half of them active-duty military officers, the remaining academics and civilian civilian employees - worked in the study. Many analysts use files in the Office of the Minister of Defense. To keep the study secrets from others, including National Security Adviser Walt W. Rostow, they do not conduct interviews or consultations with the armed forces, the White House, or with other federal agencies.
McNamara left the Department of Defense in February 1968, and his successor Clark M. Clifford received the study completed on January 15, 1969, five days before Richard Nixon's inauguration, although Clifford claimed he never read it. The study consists of 3,000 pages of historical analysis and 4,000 pages of original government documents in 47 volumes, and is classified as "Top-Sensitive Secrets". ("Sensitive" is not an official security designation; it means that access to research must be controlled.) The task force issues 15 copies; the think tank agency of RAND Corporation received two copies of Gelb, Morton Halperin and Paul Warnke, with access granted if at least two out of three were approved.
The real purpose of the Vietnam War: China's Detention
Although President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that the purpose of the Vietnam War was to secure "independent and non-Communist South Vietnam", a memorandum in January 1965 by Defense Minister Robert McNamara stated that the underlying reason was "not helping a friend." , but it contains China ".
On 3 November 1965, McNamara sent a memorandum to President Johnson, where he described "major policy decisions regarding our actions in Vietnam". The memorandum began by revealing the reason behind the bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965:
The February decision to bomb North Vietnam and the July approval of the implementation of Phase I can only be understood if they support a long-term US policy to detain China.
McNamara accused China of hiding imperial aspirations such as Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. According to McNamara, China conspires to "organize the whole of Asia" against the United States:
China - like Germany in 1917, like Germany in the West and Japan in the East in the late 30s, and like the Soviet Union in 1947 - looms as a major force threatening to undermine our interests and effectiveness in the world and, further but more threatening, to set the whole of Asia against us.
To besiege China, the United States aims to build "three fronts" as part of a "long-term effort to contain China":
There are three fronts for long-term efforts to detain China (realizing that the Soviet Union "contains" China to the north and northwest):
(a) the Japanese-Korean front;
(b) the India-Pakistan front; and
(c) front Asia Tenggara.
However, McNamara acknowledges that China's detention will ultimately sacrifice a large amount of time, money, and American life.
Vietnamese internal issues
Years before the August 2, 1964 Gulf Tonkin incident occurred, the US government indirectly or directly involved in Vietnamese affairs:
- Under President Harry S. Truman, the US government assisted France in its fight against the communist-led Viet Minh during the First Indochina War.
- Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the US government played a "direct role in the final resolution of the Geneva settlement" in 1954 by supporting young South Vietnam and quietly weakening the North Vietnamese communist state.
- Under President John F. Kennedy, the US government changed its policy towards Vietnam from limited "gambling" to "broad commitment".
- Under President Lyndon B. Johnson, the US government began a secret military operation against North Vietnamese communists in defense of South Vietnam.
The role of the United States in President Diem's ​​resurrection
In part of the Pentagon Papers, Kennedy Commitments and Programs, the US Commitment to South Vietnam is linked to the creation of the state by the United States. As recognized by the paper:
"We should note that South Vietnam (unlike other countries in Southeast Asia) is basically a creation of the United States.
In the sub-section entitled "America's Special Commitment to Vietnam", this paper emphasizes once again the role played by the United States:
- "Without U.S. support [Ngo Dinh] Diem almost certainly can not consolidate his grip on the South during 1955 and 1956."
- "Without the threat of US intervention, South Vietnam is unlikely to refuse to even discuss elections called for in 1956 under the Geneva settlement without being immediately attacked by the Viet Minh army."
- "Without US assistance in subsequent years, the Diem regime of course, and the independent South Vietnamese almost as exact, can not survive."
More specifically, the United States dispatched supplies and supplies worth US $ 28.4 million to help the Diem regime strengthen its forces. In addition, 32,000 people from the South Vietnamese Civil Guard were trained by the United States at a cost of US $ 12.7 million. It is expected that the Diem regime, after receiving a large amount of US aid, will be able to hold on to Viet Cong.
The papers identified General Edward Lansdale, who served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a "key figure" in the establishment of Ngo Dinh Diem as President of South Vietnam, and the support of the Diem regime thereafter. As Lansdale wrote in a 1961 memorandum: "We (US) must support Ngo Dinh Diem until another powerful executive can replace him legally."
The role of the United States in the overthrow of the Diem regime
According to the Pentagon Papers, the US government played a key role in the 1963 South Vietnam coup, in which President Ngo Dinh Diem was murdered. While maintaining "secret contacts" with the Vietnamese generals planning a coup d'état, the US cut its aid to President Diem and publicly supported the successor government in what writers called "essentially without the Vietnamese leader":
"For the military coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States must accept its full responsibility.In August 1963 we authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup attempt of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for the successor government.
In October we cut off the aid to Diem with direct rejection, giving the generals a green light. We maintain silent contact with them during the planning and execution of the coup and try to review their operational plans and propose a new government.
Therefore, when the nine-year Diem rule ends in a bloody manner, our involvement in its overthrow increases our responsibility and our commitment in Vietnam that is essentially without a leader. "
In early August 23, 1963, an unnamed US representative met with Vietnamese generals who planned a coup against President Diem. According to The New York Times , the US representative was later identified as CIA agent Lucien Conein.
Proposed operation
Central Intelligence Director John A. McCone proposed the following categories of military action:
- Category 1 - Air strikes at Viet Cong's major supply centers, conducted simultaneously by the South Vietnamese air force and the United States Air Force (codenamed Farmgate)
- Category 2 - Cross-border attacks at Viet Cong's main supply center, conducted by the South Vietnamese unit and US military advisers.
- Category 3 - Airstrikes are limited to North Vietnamese targets with non-marked aircraft flown exclusively by non-US crew members.
However, McCone does not believe this military action alone could lead to an escalation of the situation because "the fear of escalation may be holding Communists". In a memorandum addressed to President Johnson on July 28, 1964, McCone explained:
In response to the first or second category of action, local Communist military forces in the real area of ​​attack will react vigorously, but we believe that none of the Communist forces involved will respond with a major military movement designed to change the nature of the conflict...
The air raids in North Vietnam alone (Category 3) will evoke a sharper Communist reaction than the limited air strikes on targets in Laos, but even in this case the fear of escalation will probably hold Communists from a major military response... "
Almost a month after the Tonkin Bay incident on August 2, 1964, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy warned that further provocation should not be done until October, when the South Vietnamese government (GVN) will become fully prepared for full-scale war. against North Vietnam. In a memorandum addressed to President Johnson on September 8, 1964, Bundy wrote:
The main further question is the extent to which we must add elements to the above actions that will be deliberate to provoke DRV reaction, and revenge consequences by us.
An example of action to take into account is to run a US Navy patrol closer to the North Vietnamese coast and/or [ sic ] linking them with operation 34A.
We believe that these deliberately provocative elements should not be added any time soon while GVN is still struggling to stand up. In early October, we would probably recommend such actions depending on the progress of GVN and the Communist reaction for a while, especially for US naval patrols. "
While maritime operations played a key role in the provocation of North Vietnam, US military officials initially proposed to fly Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft across the country, but this had to be replaced by other plans.
Maps Pentagon Papers
Leak
Daniel Ellsberg knew the leaders of the task force were all right. He had worked as an assistant to McNaughton from 1964 to 1965, had worked on research for several months in 1967, and Gelb and Halperin agreed to his access to work at RAND in 1969. Now against the war, Ellsberg and his friend Anthony Russo photocopied research on the moon October 1969 with the intent to express it. Ellsberg approached Nixon's National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, Senators William Fulbright and George McGovern, and others, but no one was interested.
In February 1971, Ellsberg discussed the research with Neil Sheehan's The Neil Sheehan reporter and gave him 43 volumes in March. Prior to publication, The New York Times sought legal advice. Extra regular newspaper advice, God's Day & amp; Sir, it is advisable to oppose the publication, but the internal adviser James Goodale won by his argument that the press has the First Amendment right to publish information that is important to the public's understanding of their government policy.
The New York Times began publishing a quote on June 13, 1971; the first article in the series titled "Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces Three Decades of US Involvement Continues to Grow". The research was dubbed The Pentagon Papers during the publication of the resulting media. Street protests, political controversies, and lawsuits followed.
To ensure public debate about the contents of the newspaper, on June 29, US Senator Mike Gravel, an Alaskan Democrat, put 4,100 pages of paper into his Subcommittee notes on Public Buildings and Grounds. The sections of this paper, edited for Pebble by Howard Zinn and Noam Chomsky, were later published by Beacon Press, the publishing group of the Unitarian Universalist Association of Congregations. The federal grand jury was then forced to investigate possible violations of federal law in the release of the report. Leonard Rodberg, a servant of Gravel, was summoned to testify of his role in obtaining and arranging for the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Pebbles ask the court (in
Gravel v. United States ) to cancel a subpoena based on Speech or the Debate Clause in Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the United States.
The clause states that "for every Speech or Debate in either House, [a Senator or Representative] will not be questioned elsewhere", meaning that Gravel can not be sued for anything said on the Senate floor, and, by extension, for anything that goes into Records of Congress , allows letters to be read in general without threats from attempted treason and conviction. When the Gravel request was reviewed by the US Supreme Court, the Court rejected a request to extend this protection to Gravel or its legislative aide, Leonard Rodberg, because the grandpo jury voices presented to them were associated with third parties rather than any action they did themselves for the preparation of the later material put into the Congress Record. Nevertheless, the grand jury investigation was stopped, and the publication of the letters was never prosecuted.
Later, Ellsberg said the documents "show unconstitutional behavior by the succession of the president, their oath offenses and the oath offenses of any of their subordinates." He added that he leaked Paper to end what he regarded as "the wrong war."
Media restrictions by Nixon
President Nixon initially planned to do nothing about research publications because it embarrassed the Johnson and Kennedy governments rather than his own. But Henry Kissinger assured the president that not opposing the publication was a negative precedent for a secret future. The government believes Ellsberg and Russo are guilty of crimes under the Espionage Act of 1917, as they have no authority to publish confidential documents. After failing to persuade the Times to voluntarily stop publication on June 14, Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Nixon obtained a federal court order that forced the Times to stop publication after three articles. Times publisher Arthur Ochs Sulzberger said:
Newspapers, as our editorial said this morning, really [(sic), may "reveal"] parts of history that should be available, much longer. I just do not feel there is a breach of national security, in the sense that we give secrets to the enemy.
The newspaper appealed the order, and the case of New York Times Co. v. The United States (403 U.S. 713) quickly rose through the US legal system to the Supreme Court.
On June 18, 1971, The Washington Post began publishing its own series of articles based on Pentagon Papers; Ellsberg has given the section to the Post Ben Bagdikian reporter. So bring that information to the editor of Ben Bradlee. That day, US Attorney General Assistant William Rehnquist asked Post to stop the publication. After the paper was denied, Rehnquist sought orders in the US district court. Judge Murray Gurfein refused to issue such an order, writing that "[t] he security of the Nation is not in the castle alone." Security also lies in the value of our free institutions.A press of a sissy, stubborn press, press everywhere must be suffered by those who have the authority to defend the values ​​of greater freedom of expression and the right of the people to know. "The government appealed the decision, and on June 26 the Supreme Court agreed to hear it along with the case of the New York Times . Fifteen other newspapers received copies of the research and started publishing it.
The Supreme Court allows for further publication
On June 30, 1971, the Supreme Court ruled, 6-3, that the government failed to meet the heavy burden of evidence required for prior restraint orders. Nine judges wrote nine disagreed opinions about substantive essentials.
Only a free and uncontrolled press can effectively expose fraud in government. And most importantly among the free press responsibilities is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving people and sending them to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shoots and shells.
Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck summarized the reactions of editors and journalists at the time:
As the press room of the Times and Post began to hum with the removal of censorship orders, American journalists pondered seriously the fact that during the fifteen days 'free press' of the state had been prevented from publishing important documents and for their problems have been given unconvincing and unattractive 'burden-proof' decisions by the Supreme Court that are sharply divided. There was a sense of relief, but no great joy, in the editorial office of American publishers and broadcasters.
Legal charges against Ellsberg
Ellsberg surrendered to the authorities in Boston, and admitted that he had given letters to the press: "I feel that as an American citizen, as a responsible citizen, I can no longer cooperate in hiding this information from the American public. I do this clearly at my own peril and I am ready to answer all the consequences of this decision ". He was charged by a grand jury in Los Angeles for allegedly stealing and holding secret documents. Federal District Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr. declared a cancellation of the trial and rejected all charges against Ellsberg and Russo on May 11, 1973, after it was revealed that: agents acting on the orders of the Nixon administration illegally entered the office of the Ellsberg psychiatrist and tried to steal the files; a representative of the Nixon administration approached an Ellsberg court judge with an offer of the FBI director's work; some irregularities appear in government cases including claims that they have lost the record of illegal wiretaps against Ellsberg by the White House of the Plumbers in the Watergate scandal that coincided. Byrne resolved: "The totality of the circumstances of this case which I wrote briefly only offends the sense of justice The peculiar events have inadvertently infected prosecutions on this case." Ellsberg and Russo were released due to the cancellation of the trial; they are not released in violation of the espionage Act.
In March 1972, political scientist Samuel L. Popkin, then an assistant professor at Harvard University, was jailed for a week because of his refusal to answer questions before the jury investigated the Pentagon Papers case, during a hearing before the Boston Federal District Court.. The Faculty Council then issued a resolution condemning the interrogation of intellectuals by the government on the ground that "unlimited monument rights to ask any questions and to expose citation witnesses to insults can easily threaten scientific research".
Gelb estimates that Times only publishes about 5% of 7,000 research pages. The Beacon Press edition is also incomplete. Halperin, who originally classified this research as confidential, obtained most of the unpublished section under the Freedom of Information Act and the University of Texas published it in 1983. The National Security Archive published the remaining part in 2002. The study itself remains formally classified until 2011.
Impact
The paper reveals that the United States has widened its war with Cambodian and Lao bombings, coastal attacks on North Vietnam, and Marine Corps attacks, none reported by American media. The most destructive revelations in the newspapers reveal that four administrations (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson), have mislead the public about their intentions. For example, the Eisenhower government is actively working against the Geneva Accord. John F. Kennedy's government knew of a plan to overthrow South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem before his death in a November 1963 coup. President Johnson has decided to widen the war while promising "we are not looking for wider war" during the 1964 presidential campaign, including plans to bomb Vietnam North before the 1964 Election. President Johnson had openly opposed it during the election and claimed that his opponent Barry Goldwater was the one who wanted to bomb North Vietnam.
In another example, a memo from the Department of Defense under Johnson's Government mentions the reasons for American persistence:
- 70% - To avoid an embarrassing US defeat (our reputation as guarantor).
- 20% - To keep [South Korea] (and adjacent territory) from Chinese hands.
- 10% - To allow [South Vietnamese] people to enjoy a better and more free way of life.
- ALSO - To get out of the unacceptable spotless crisis of the method used.
- NO - To help friends, though it's hard to stay signed in when prompted.
Another controversy was that President Johnson sent combat troops to Vietnam on July 17, 1965, before pretending to consult his advisor on July 21-27, per cable stating that "Deputy Defense Minister Cyrus Vance told McNamara that the President had approved 34 Plan Battalions and will try to push through a backup call. "
In 1988, when the cable was declassified, it revealed "there is continuing uncertainty about the [Johnson's] final decision, which must wait for the recommendation of Secretary McNamara and the views of Congressional leaders, especially the views of Senator [Richard] Russell."
Nixon's lawyer, General Erwin N. Griswold later described Papers as an example of "massive overclassification" with "no trace of threats to national security." Papers publications have little or no effect on the ongoing wars as they deal with documents written several years before publication.
After the release of Pentagon Papers , Goldwater said:
During the campaign, President Johnson continued to affirm that he would never send American children to fight in Vietnam. As I said, he knew at that time that American children would be sent. In fact, I knew about ten days before the Republican Convention. You see I'm called the trigger happy, warm, happy, and all the time Johnson said he would never send an American boy, I know he'll do it.
Senator Birch Bayh, who thinks the publication of the Pentagon Papers is justified, says:
The existence of these documents, and the fact that they say one thing and people are led to believe something else, is the reason we have today's credibility gap, the reason why people do not trust the government. This is the same thing that has happened during the last two and a half years of this government. There is a difference between what the President says and what the government actually does, and I am confident that they will make the right decision if they have all the facts.
Full release in 2011
On May 4, 2011, the National Archives and Archive Administration announced that the letters will be declassified and released to Richard Nixon's Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California on June 13, 2011. The release dates include Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson. Library and Archives office in College Park, Maryland.
The release was fully coordinated by the National Archives Rectification Center (NDC) as a special project to mark the anniversary of the report. The NDC works with institutions that have classified control over material to prevent forgery of the last 11 words from Pentagon Papers that will not be available. It is not known which 11 words are at issue.
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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